A Shared-Key Security Protocol and Its Flaw

Authors

  • Waseem Akhtar Mufti Department of Computer Science, Aalborg University Fredrik Bajers Vej 7E, 9220 Aalborg

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31384/jisrmsse/2005.03.1.1

Keywords:

Shared-Key, Security Protocol, cryptographic protocols, Nonce

Abstract

Behaviour of cryptographic protocols is notoriously hard to understand because such a protocol is a concurrent process and can run with multiple instances in parallel. Such behaviour becomes more complicated because of malicious activities of attacker who is always assumed to be present in the environment of network. Being a public network (internet) it is very difficult to know who is who? Such threats need to be handled by a flawless security protocol which can guarantee to security of computer systems. In this paper we have analysed and compared the two versions (flawed and un-flawed) of NeedhamSchroeder Shared-Key (NSSK) protocol and have provided clear and detailed description to understand its flaw and how an unflawed version defeats an attacker.

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Published

2005-06-30

How to Cite

Mufti, W. A. (2005). A Shared-Key Security Protocol and Its Flaw. JISR Management and Social Sciences & Economics, 3(1), 2–5. https://doi.org/10.31384/jisrmsse/2005.03.1.1

Issue

Section

Original Articles